Macroscopic objects appear to have definite positions. In a manyworlds interpretation of quantum theory, this appearance is an illusion; the correct view is the "view from outside" in which even macroscopic objects are in general in a superposition of different positions. In the Bohm model, objects really are in definite positions. This additional aspect of reality is accessible only from the "inside"; thus in the Bohm model the view from inside can be more correct than is the view from outside.
Quantum mechanics is an enormously successful theory. There has been experimental verification of quantum predictions for processes involving distances ranging from about 10 −16 cm (photoproduction inpp scattering, ref. [1] ) to about 10 km (Bell's inequality for entangled photons, ref [2] ). The successes of quantum mechanics come in spite of the fact that the most straightforward interpretation of one of the most fundamental aspects of quantum theory-the linear evolution implied by the Schrödinger equationwould lead one to expect the existence of superpositions of macroscopicallydistinguishable states, in complete contradiction to the way the world appears to us to be. This discrepancy between naive prediction and apparent observation can be "resolved" by postulating that the state-vector experiences "collapse" as well as Schrödinger evolution. However, in this paper I will discuss other interpretations of quantum theory, interpretations in which there is no such collapse, and in which the state-vector does indeed evolve exactly as dictated by the Schrödinger equation.
The seeming implausibility of the existence of superpositions of macroscopically-distinguishable states is vividly illustrated by the story of Schrödinger's cat [3] . As the title of this paper implies, I want to discuss what someone in the position of the cat in that story might know, and for this purpose I will suppose that a cat can be aware of himself and of his surroundings, just as a person might be. Any reader unable to imagine such a sentient cat can just substitute the word "human" for "cat" wherever it appears in this discussion. However, since I doubt that my reader's credulity would extend to the case of a sentient dead cat, I will alter the story somewhat, so that the two possibilities for the cat correspond to being in two different positions, rather than to life or death.
So here is the story which I wish to discuss. An experimenter, whom I will identify as being Schrödinger himself, places into a box a cat, together with a radioactive sample, such that perhaps in the course of an hour one of the atoms decays, but also, with equal probability, perhaps none do. The cat has been trained so that, at the end of the hour, if there has been a decay he moves to the left side of the box, but if there has not been any decay he moves to the right side. After placing the cat and the sample in the box, Schrödinger seals the box and never does look inside again, so that the contents of the box constitute an isolated system once the box is closed.
Let B denote the system consisting of the contents of the box (the cat and the radioactive atoms), and let |ψ be the state-vector for that system. For the time t initial when the box is first closed, we can write |ψ(t initial ) = |atoms, initial |cat, initial .
I wish to discuss the situation within the box at a time after the hour has passed, which I will refer to simply as time t. I am supposing that the state-vector of a system, even one containing macroscopic and/or sentient components, never experiences collapse, so I write
(2) We could if we wished write a state-vector for the combined system consisting of B together with Schrödinger, but that state-vector would simply be the product of |ψ(t) as given in eq. (2) and the state-vector for Schrödinger. Now, at time t it will certainly appear to the cat that it is in a definite position (just as it appears to each of us that we are in a definite position), although the state-vector in eq. (2) indicates a superposition of different positions. As suggested by its title, this paper is devoted to a discussion, using the example of Schrödinger's cat, of the following question: Does the appearance of a definite position correspond to some truth (as opposed to being an illusion), and if so, is this a truth which could also be known by an outside observer? I will examine the answers to this question in two versions of no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics. One version is the many-worlds interpretation [4] in which the state-vector is taken to represent a complete description of a system. The other version assumes that the state-vector description is not complete; I will discuss in particular the interpretation given by de Broglie [5] and by Bohm [6] (which I will call simply the Bohm model), but similar considerations would presumably apply to, e.g., the modal interpretations of refs. [7] .
I shall take the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics [4] to be based on the following two assertions:
• Completeness: The state of an isolated system is completely described by a Hilbert-space vector (which I will denote by |ψ ).
• No collapse: The state-vector |ψ evolves according to the Schrödinger equation
Since in our story Schrödinger has prepared the initial state of the system B, we may assume that he know its initial state-vector, as given in eq. (1). Then if he knows the rate of decay of the atoms and the way the cat has been trained (i. e., if he knows the Hamiltonian for B) he can use eq. (3) to calculate |ψ(t) for the later time t. Thus we may assume that Schrödinger knows the state vector |ψ(t) , even though he does not interact with the system B after the initial time.
We can also imagine that the cat knows the state vector |ψ(t) , for it too might know how the system was prepared and might be able to solve eq. (3). That would be an example of an inhabitant of one "branch" of the many-world state-vector being aware of the existence of another branch, but that is certainly allowed in the many-worlds interpretation. 2 For a more realistic example, consider an experimenter who prepares an electron in an eigenstate of S x and then measures its value of S z to be + 1 2h . Since she remembers how the spin was originally prepared, she knows (if she is an adherent of the many-worlds interpretation) that there is another branch in which S z was measured to be − 1 2h . However, the fact that the cat might be thought to know as much as does Schrödinger does not address the question which forms the title of this paper, which is whether the cat can know something which Schrödinger does not. Although a great deal can be said about what the cat might know (see for example ref. [9] ), it is not necessary to address that issue to answer our question within the many-worlds context, for the following reason:
We have seen that Schrödinger, even without interacting with the system B after its initial preparation, can know the state-vector |ψ(t) , and in the many-worlds interpretation there is nothing else to know. Thus Schrödinger knows everything (by which I mean everything about B, of course), and therefore there is nothing else for the cat to know. Conversely, any interpretation in which there is anything beyond the state-vector for the cat to know necessarily violates the completeness assertion which I have taken to be part of the definition of the many-worlds interpretation. Thus, without even examining the issue of what the cat might know, we see that the manyworlds interpretation gives a negative answer to the question posed in the title; the cat does not know anything that Schrödinger does not know.
The Bohm model [5, 6] subscribes to the "no collapse" but not the "completeness" assertion of the many-worlds interpretation. Instead, it is asserted that each particle has, at each time, a definite value of a position variable; I will refer to this as the "Bohm position" of the particle (and by the Bohm position of an extended object I will mean the center-of-mass of the Bohm positions of the object's constituent particles). It is also generally assumed that for macroscopic objects the observed position coincides with the Bohm position. Logically, there is another option: to formally ascribe a Bohm position to each particle, but when it comes to interpreting the formalism, to completely ignore the Bohm positions and to proceed as one would in a many-worlds interpretation. Since neither I nor anyone that I know of favors this option, I will not pursue it further, and will thus take the Bohm model to include the specification that, for macroscopic objects, the observed position is indeed the Bohm position. 3 For definiteness, let me say that the Bohm position of the cat in our story, is, at time t, at the left. Then we can say that the cat really is at the left, and that the cat knows (correctly) that he is at the left. In saying this, I am certainly not attempting to construct any theory of consciousness, nor to say how it is that we (or a cat) come to know anything. I am merely combining the obvious remark that we do, after all, perceive ourselves to be in definite locations with the feature of the Bohm model that this perception is considered to be correct.
One might make the following objection to this: if we say that the cat represented by the first term on the right-hand side of eq. (2) (correctly) sees himself as being at the left, should we not also say that the other cat in the second term (incorrectly) sees himself at the right? This objection has no force within the Bohm model. There is no "other" cat; the cat really is at the left, even though there are two terms in the state-vector. One also might worry that, since Bohm positions can influence each other nonlocally, the Bohm model might provide some way for Schrödinger to learn that the cat is at the left without his having to look in the box. But of course this does not happen: since Schrödinger and the system B are in a non-entangled state (i.e., the joint state-vector is a product), the Bohm position of any part of B is independent of the Bohm position of any part of Schrödinger. In fact, if Schrödinger were to look inside the box, it would not be to learn what |ψ(t) is (he already knows that), but rather to entangle himself with B so that he might know the Bohm position of the cat. So, since in our story Schrödinger does not look inside the box, and therefore does not become entangled with B, we can conclude that Schrödinger does not know that the cat is at the left. But the cat does know. So the Bohm model allows a positive answer to the question posed in the title: the cat does know something that Schrödinger does not know.
We have seen that the two interpretations I have discussed give different answers to our title question. In the many-worlds interpretation the cat could perhaps know as much as does Schrödinger, but certainly not more, since Schrödinger knows everything; in the Bohm model there is something to be known beyond what Schrödinger knows, and that something can indeed be known by the cat. Let me conclude with the following three remarks:
First remark. I have certainly not attempted to provide any explanation for human (or feline!) consciousness. The cat in the story could have been replaced by a device which moves left or right and which contains an internal pointer which indicates the position of the device. Then the term |cat at left in eq. (2) could be replaced by |device at left, pointer points left , with an analogous replacement for |cat at right . What makes the many-worlds interpretation viable is that the resulting |ψ(t) would then show a correlation between the position of the device and the indication of the pointer. One might perhaps maintain that, in the context of a many-worlds interpretation, this correlation itself allows us to say that the pointer "knows" the location of the device (see for example ref. [9] ), but in any case since the state-vector |ψ(t) and hence this correlation are known to Schrödinger, we would still not say that the pointer "knows" something that Schrödinger does not. In the Bohm model, the device really would be at the left, and the pointer really would point left, but Schrödinger would not know that.
Second remark. Here is a different version of the story I have been discussing. This morning I flipped a quantum coin, to determine whether I should work in my office this afternoon, or whether I should go outside for a walk instead. Therefore, my wave function this afternoon has support both in my office and on the walking paths outside. 4 In fact, here I am working, and so I know that my Bohm position is here in the office. My colleague, who is familiar with my practice of consulting that coin but has not seen me today, does perhaps know my wave function, but does not know my Bohm position.
Is this at all surprising? In the Bohm model, the situation is simply that I see where I am, but my colleague does not see me, so of course I know something that my colleague does not know. What perhaps is surprising is that, in the many-worlds interpretation, I don't know anything unknown to my colleague, since there are no "facts" beyond those represented in the wave function. Last remark. Returning now to the first version of the story with the cat, we have said that, since according to eq. (3) the state-vector evolves deterministically, knowledge of the state-vector of system B at the initial time is sufficient for knowledge at the later time t. This is in contrast to interpretations in which the state-vector can suffer collapse; in those interpretations, knowledge of the initial state-vector is not sufficient, so that an additional measurement would be required. Of course Schrödinger did have to interact with the system B in order to prepare it in its initial state, but after that initial interaction, he can simply calculate |ψ at any later time. So |ψ(t) might be said to represent "public" reality which is accessible to anyone who knows its initial value. And in the many-worlds interpretation, that is all the reality there is. In the Bohm model, there is an additional aspect to reality, namely the Bohm positions. The Bohm model is also deterministic, but Schrödinger does not know the Bohm position of the cat at time t because (although he did prepare the initial state of B) he does not know well enough the initial Bohm positions. So this additional aspect of reality is only accessible from within the system B.
